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THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN
ALABAMA, II: A CRAZY QUILT RESTITCHED
Marjorie Fine Knowles*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dramatic and substantial changes have occurred during the
past decade in the traditional relationship between American wo-
men and their families, their work, their marriages, their educa-
tion, and their money.' These dramatic changes have been accom-
panied by major developments in the law, both federal2 and state.3
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B., 1960, Smith College; LL.B., 1965,
Harvard Law School. The author served as Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor,
1979-1980. The author wishes to thank the following persons for their assistance: Rebekah
Adams, Ellen Brooks, Lisa R. Browning, Peggy Cain, Penny Davis, Clara L Fryer, Libba
Latham, Denise Littleton, Marian Phillips, and Barry Thompson.
1. For a sampling of the major changes occurring in the lives of American women, see
THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TIE OBSERVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, THE SPIRr OF HOUSTON (1978) (official report) and PRIES-
DENT'S ADVISORY CoMMrrrER FOR WOMEN, VOmES FOR WoMEN (1980) (official report).
For an examination of the growth of the female paid labor force and its many implica-
tions, see THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION (R. Smith ed. 1979). A useful
compilation of data detailing employment patterns of women workers appears in a report by
the Commission on Civil Rights. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CILD CARE AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN (1981).
Concerning women and education, see PROJECT ON EQUAL EDUCATION RIoHrs, NOW LE-
GAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, STALLED AT THE START 11 (1978).
2. See U.S. COMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON WOM-N's EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS, EQUITY FOR THE EIGHTIES (1980) (1979 an-
nual report examining the Women's Educational Equity Act and its implications); PRoJEcr
ON EQUAL EDUCATION RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 21-30 (impact of Title IX); TE SOUTHAST-
ERN PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrTEE, ALMOST As FAIRLY
9-18 (1977) (report on Title IX after one year in Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Georgia, and Louisiana); Note, Title IX CoUerage of Gender Discrimination in Em-
ployment Practices of Educational Institutions, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 261 (1981).
One nonlegal focal point of change is the effort to avoid sexism in language. See NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN SocIETY FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, THE RIGHT WORD: GmDLINES FOR AVOIDING SEx-BIASED LANGUAGE (rev.
ed. 1979).
3. See, e.g., Ellis, The Decline and Near Fall of Statutory Sexism in Mississippi, 51
Miss. L.J. 191 (1980); PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION FOR WoMEN, IMPACT OF THlE PENNSLVANIA
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Indeed, the pace of change has been so rapid that the legal status
of women in Alabama no longer fits the pattern sketched by this
author only five years ago;4 significant developments have taken
place in nearly every area of law reviewed. 5 The purpose of this
Article is to report and analyze these legal developments-to up-
date the author's earlier article and to show that the "crazy quilt"
of women's rights in Alabama now bears a different pattern.
Although the time for ratification of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution has passed, the legislative
and judicial steps toward the establishment of gender-neutral laws
reported in this Article evidence a remarkable movement in this
state toward sexual equality under the law. Neither this movement
toward sexual equality, nor this Article's observation of that pro-
gress, however, supports those who argue that the Equal Rights
Amendment is not needed.7 Clearly, in the absence of a constitu-
tional mandate, both legislative and judicial steps toward sexual
equality are reversible.8 The wealth of new legislation that is pro-
STATE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (rev. ed. 1980).
4. Knowles, The Legal Status of Women in Alabama: A Crazy Quilt, 29 ALA. L. Rsv.
427 (1978).
For another review of the legal status of women in Alabama, see J. CRITrTENDEN, T IE
LEGAL STATUS OF HOMEMAKERS IN ALABAMA (1977) (report prepared for the Homemaker's
Committee of the National Commission on the Observation of International Women's Year).
For a list of provisions of the Alabama Code and Constitution that contain distinctions
based on sex, see THE ALABAMA WOMEN'S COMMISSION, CITATIONS FROM ALABAMA LAW (2d
rev. ed. 1980).
5. Of the eight areas examined by the author in 1978, Knowles, supra note 4-viz.,
contracts, torts, property, family law, citizenship, criminal law, labor law, and the legal pro-
fession-only labor law showed no substantial change.
6. See id. at 432 (Alabama law concerning women described as patchwork, resembling
a "crazy quilt").
7. Contra, R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 39-53 (1980)
(arguing that a constitutional amendment for changes already in progress is not needed).
8. Appeal to existing constitutional protections offers little consolation to those who
fear that the legislative and judicial progress of the last decade may be reversed; in its re-
cent reviews of gender-based statutes the Supreme Court has been uncertain in its standard
of review and uneven in its conclusions. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 94
(1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("although the Court purports to apply the Craig v. Boren
test, the 'similarly situated' analysis the Court employs is in fact significantly different from
the Craig v. Boren approach"). Compare Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (gender-based
classifications must be substantially related to an important governmental objective) (hold-
ing Alabama's gender-based alimony statute unconstitutional) and Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (gender-based classification must be tailored to further an impor-
tant governmental interest) (holding statute giving husband the unilateral right to dispose
of community property unconstitutional) with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981)
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ducing legal sexual equality in Alabama highlights the curious fail-
ure of the Alabama Legislature and the legislatures of fourteen
other states9 to recognize the need for the Amendment by ratifying
it.10
In the past five years the legal institutions of both Alabama
and the nation have reexamined those areas of the law most asym-
metrical in their treatment of men and women and have corrected
some inequities based on out-dated sexual stereotypes." During
this period, issues first raised by women's groups have found their
legitimate place on the public agenda. For example, at the state
level Alabama is currently addressing the once taboo subject of
family violence.12 At the federal level the discussion of employment
opportunities has expanded to include topics such as comparable
worth,13 fetal protection from workplace hazards,1 and child
care. 1 5 The changes in Alabama law since 1977 that are described
("The Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly. .. .")
(upholding the constitutionality of male-only draft registration on the ground that men and
women are not similarly situated with respect to the draft).
For a review of women's organizations' use of the judicial system to combat sex discrim-
ination, see K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF THE COURTS (1980).
9. The 15 nonratifying states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Utah, and Virginia. See SPOKESWOMAN, Nov. 1, 1979, at 5-6.
10. For a thorough review of the impact of the Equal Rights Amendment, see B.
BROWN, A FREEDMAN, H. KATz & A. PICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW: THE IMPAcr OF
THE ERA ON STATE LAW (1977).
On the impact of a state equal rights amendment identical in wording to the federal
amendment, see PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION FOR WOMEN, supra note 3.
The latest report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights is U.S. CoumssoN
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (June 1981).
11. Compare Knowles, supra note 4, pts. V (Property) & VI (Family Law), with pta.
IV (Property) & V (Family Law) infra.
12. See notes 91-98 infra and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of comparable worth, see, e.g., Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimi-
nation Under Title VII: Equal Pay for Equal Work or Equal Pay for Comparable Work? 22
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 421 (1981); 30 AM. U.L. REV. 547 (1981). For an argument that Title
VII requires equal pay for comparable work and a description of a method to identify jobs
held by women that are comparable to better paid jobs held by men, see Note, Equal Pay,
Comparable Work, and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the
Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1981); Williams, Firing the Woman
to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportu-
nity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981).
15. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1.
A bill introduced in the United States Congress entitled the Economic Equity Act of
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 33:2:375
below reflect both the extent of reexamination and correction that
has occurred and this state's attempt to grapple with "new reali-
ties"-problems long submerged and only now being ad-
dressed-in the lives of American women and men.
II. CONTRACTS
The traditional discrimination against women in contract law
was embodied in the principle denying the capacity of married wo-
men to make contracts.1" Progress toward investing married wo-
men with full legal capacity to contract dates back to the nine-
teenth century,17 and Alabama has generally shared in that
progress."8 The one exception in this area was its statutory require-
ment that a married woman receive written consent from her hus-
band to convey her real property.19 Until 197720 Alabama had the
distinction of being the only state to restrict a married woman's
conveyance of property in this manner, 1 and Alabama courts held
that the restriction applied not only to conveyances but also to
contracts for the sale of land.2 2
The 1975 and 1977 decisions of Trabits v. Snow23 dramatize
the Alabama Supreme Court's determination to lift the statutory
restriction on a married woman's right to convey her real property
and to contract for that conveyance. In the 1975 decision, the Ala-
1981 and described by one of its co-authors as "the most comprehensive economic rights
package ever introduced into the U.S. Senate," addresses "7 critical areas-tax and retire-
ment rights, child and dependent care, military service, farm credit and agricultural taxa-
tion, accessibility of insurance, maintenance and child support, and the Federal regulatory
process." 127 CONG. REc. 3510 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger).
16. Under the common-law doctrine of coverture, a married woman was denied the
right to enter a contract alone. McAnally v. Alabama Insane Hosp., 109 Ala. 109, 113, 19 So.
492, 493 (1895). See Knowles, supra note 4, at 432-33.
17. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 432-33.
18. Following adoption of the Married Women's Property Acts in Alabama beginning
in 1846, see Knowles, supra note 4, at 434-36 & nn.37-62, the State's married women were
given the capacity to contract as if sole. Ala. Code § 2346 (1886) (now codified at ALA. CODE
§ 30-4-8 (1975)). Additional contractual rights were bestowed in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 438 & nn.66-73.
19. Ala. Code § 30-4-12 (1975) (declared unconstitutional, Peddy v. Montgomery, 345
So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977)).
20. Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977) (§ 30-4-12 of the Alabama Code
declared unconstitutional).
21. Johnson, Sex and Property, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1079 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Thompson v. Odom, 279 Ala. 211, 184 So. 2d 120 (1975).
23. 294 Ala. 313, 316 So. 2d 336 (1975); Snow v. Trabits, 347 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 1977).
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bama Supreme Court held that a contract to sell land was not sub-
ject to enforcement by a decree of specific performance because the
husband of the wife-vendor had signed the contract only as a wit-
ness and had not specifically indicated his agreement to the trans-
action as then required by statute.2 The court noted, however,
that complainants had failed to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute. It allowed the parties to amend their pleadings, and
they did raise the issue of the constitutionality of the statute. In
the meantime, the court rendered its decision in Peddy v. Mont-
gomery,25 holding that the Alabama Code provision "limiting the
freedom of a married woman to alienate or mortgage her lands, or
any interest therein, without the assent and concurrence of her
husband, violates the [equal protection clause]. ' 28 By the time the
court's second opinion in Trabits v. Snow" appeared, the question
whether Mr. Trabits' signature represented his assent to the con-
veyance had been mooted by the pronouncement in Peddy v.
Montgomery that his signature was no longer required.28
Now that a married woman's right to convey freely or contract
to convey her real property is established, no significant legal dis-
crepancies remain in the treatment of men and women in Alabama
contract law; however, several statutes still contain anachronistic
wording which implies that only men enter into the contractual ar-
rangements at issue.2
24. 294 Ala. 313, 317, 316 So. 2d 336, 339 (1975).
25. 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977).
26. Id. at 637.
27. Snow v. Trabits, 347 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 1977).
28. "The husband's signature is no longer necessary to validate a wife's contract to
convey land owned by her, as a witness or otherwise." Id. at 397.
29. E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-131 (1975) ("Any money or thing paid or delivered to any
person whether as principal, agent or broker in furtherance or settlement of any contract
made in violation of this article may be recovered in any action brought by the person pay-
ing the same, his wife or child."); ALA. CODE § 8-1-150 (1975):
(a) All contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration are
void. Any person who has paid any money or delivered any thing of value lost upon
any game or wager may recover such money, thing or its value by an action com-
menced within six months from the time of such payment or delivery.
(b) Any other person may also recover the amount of such money, thing or its
value by an action commenced within 12 months after the payment or delivery
thereof for the use of the wife or, if no wife, the children or, if no children, the next of




Great strides toward the equality of men and women in their
capacity to sue and be sued in tort actions occurred prior to 1978.80
Common-law precedents that both protected 1 and restricted 2
married women's actions in tort were abolished. Another important
tort law restriction in Alabama disappeared in 1979 when the state
legislature amended section 6-5-390-3 to make the cause of action
for the injury of a minor child available on a sex-neutral basis.
Until the 1979 amendment, the father had the primary right
to sue for an injury to his minor child and the mother could bring
suit for injury to her minor child only if the father was dead, had
deserted the family, was in prison under a sentence of two years or
more, was confined in a hospital for the insane, or had been de-
clared mentally incompetent. The justification for the disparity
between the mother's and the father's right to sue under the stat-
ute lay in the father's legal duty to support his minor children s"
"the father has the primary duty to support and maintain the mi-
nor children . . .. [T]herefore . . . the parent with this primary
obligation is entitled to any damages recovered as a result of injury
to. . . a minor child. '36 The Code section governing actions for the
wrongful death of a minor3 7 also gave the father primary right to
sue and granted the mother a cause of action only "in cases men-
tioned in section 6-5-390." 8
In 1979 the Alabama Legislature amended the portion of sec-
tion 6-5-390 that specifies who may bring an action for injury to a
30. See generally Knowles, supra note 4, at 442-47.
31. At common law a husband was held liable for his wife's torts whether committed
before or after marriage. 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 72, 74 (1935). In Alabama,
this common-law liability was abolished by statute. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-4-6 to -7 (1975).
32. At common law a husband could maintain an action for loss of consortium, but a
wife could not maintain a similar action. Alabama adhered to the common-law view, see
Smith v. United Constr. Workers, Dist. 50, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960), until 1974.
The right to sue for loss of consortium was extended to the wife in Swartz v. United States
Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881 (1974) (overruling Smith v. United Constr. Work.
ers, Dist. 50, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960)).
33. ALA. CODE § 6-5-390 (Supp. 1981).
34. ALA. CODE § 6-5-390 (1975) (amended, 1979).
35. Jones v. Jones, 355 So. 2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1978).
36. Id. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 444-46.
37. ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (1975).
38. Id.
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minor child. 9 The Code now provides that if a father and mother
are living together as husband and wife, each has an equal right to
bring a suit for damages. If the father and mother are not living
together as husband and wife or if legal custody has been vested in
either party or some third party, the party having legal custody
has the exclusive right to bring the action. °
The legislature did not similarly amend the Wrongful Death of
a Minor statute; accordingly, that section still provides that the
mother has a cause of action only "in cases mentioned in section 6-
5-390.' 1 In light of the amendment of section 6-5-390, however,
the Wrongful Death of a Minor statute's reference to the "cases
mentioned in section 6-5-390" is at best confusing and at worst
meaningless. 42
The Alabama courts have neither ruled on the amended ver-
sion of section 6-5-390 nor interpreted section 6-5-391 in light of
that amendment. To be consistent with the obvious legislative in-
tent in amending section 6-5-390, however, the cause of action in
section 6-5-391 for the wrongful death of a minor should be availa-
ble to either a mother or father on the same terms as the cause of
action for injury to a minor child. Dictum in a 1980 case for wrong-
ful death of a minor in which the cause of action arose before the
1979 amendment suggests that the Alabama Supreme Court will
read sections 6-5-390 and -391 together to permit the mother's en-
larged right of action in the amended injury statute to apply to the
mother's right of action under the wrongful death statute as well.43
39. ALA. CODE § 6-5-390 (Supp. 1981).
40. Id.
41. ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (1975).
42. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
43. Mattingly v. Cummings, 392 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1980) (constitutionality of § 6-5-391
upheld despite its conditional priority to fathers where the cause of action arose before the
statute was amended).
When read together, these two sections provide that the father shall have the
primary right to commence an action for the wrongful death of his minor child, and
the mother has a secondary right to do so. Her right to initiate the action is contin-
gent upon the father's inability to do so on account of his death, desertion, imprison-
ment, or insanity. Although that priority has been recently amended, effective July






The law of property in Alabama has become increasingly sex-
neutral. At common law, no special disabilities were imposed on
single women in the ownership, management, and disposition of
property," but married women were singularly disabled in those
areas; over the last century, the old restrictions were gradually re-
moved, mainly by legislative action.45 While both the Alabama
Legislature and the Supreme Court of Alabama have taken signifi-
cant steps in the last five years to change the remaining marital-
status and gender-based property laws, the most dramatic recent
step was the adoption in 1982 of a comprehensive sex-neutral Pro-
bate Code." To understand the significance of this legislation, it is
helpful to review the preceding steps taken by the legislative and
judicial branches; statutes enacted by the legislature will be
detailed first, starting with the new Code, followed by an examina-
tion of judicial decisions in this field.
While a thorough examination of the new Probate Code is be-
yond the scope of this Article, certain salient points should be
noted. First, the language used in the statute, while retaining the
so-called generic "he," is otherwise completely sex-neutral. Spouse,
married person, and parent, for example, are used throughout.
Changes of direct relevance include the abolition of both
dower and curtesy,4 7 the extension of the right of election to a sur-
viving widower, 8 and entitlement of a surviving spouse to a home-
stead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, whether
or not he or she takes an elective share. 4" There are also changes in
the rules governing the intestate share of the surviving spouse"
that generally give a surviving spouse a larger share than under
previous laws.51 Throughout the new Code, benefits and detriments
appear to be allocated on a sex-neutral basis. While this is a very
44. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 35 (1969).
45. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 432-33, 448.
46. Alabama Probate Code, Pub. Act No. 399, 1982 Ala. Acts _. This act will be
effective January 1, 1983. Id. § 8-101.
47. Id. § 2-113, 1982 Ala. Acts -,
48. Id. § 2-203, 1982 Ala. Acts .
49. Id. § 2-206, 1982 Ala. Acts -, - These are defined and explained in §§ 2-401, 2-
402, 2-403, 2-404.
50. Id. § 2-102, 1982 Ala. Acts
51. Id. § 2-102, Commentary, 1982 Ala. Acts ..
382 [Vol. 33:2:375
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desirable step, efforts should be made to assure that women, who
are still economically disadvantaged in the market place and who
may have been laboring under the illusion that the law afforded
them a protected place in dealing with property, are not unfairly
disadvantaged.
To appreciate fully the impact of the new Probate Code, it is
illuminating to trace the smaller changes made over the last five
years, bearing in mind that all the statutes discussed below are
now within the new comprehensive enactment.
Intestate succession to a decedent's real property was con-
trolled by section 43-3-1 of the Alabama Code. 2 Under prior law
the "husband or wife of the intestate" received the real estate of
the deceased, "subject to the payment of debts, charges against the
estate, and the widow's dower" only "[i]f there are no children or
their descendants, no father or mother, and no brothers or sisters
or their descendants. . . ."53 The husband or wife was, therefore,
sixth in line of descent. In 1980 the legislature amended this stat-
ute to advance the husband or wife of the intestate from sixth to
second place in the order of succession to the deceased's real prop-
erty." The intestate's children or their descendants remained first
in line to inherit the real property of the deceased, subject to pay-
ment of debts, charges against the estate, and the widow's dower
rights.55 Although this particular change did not eliminate a provi-
sion that discriminated against women on its face, the revision did
affect women disproportionately because statistically women out-
live their husbands.5
Under prior law husband and wife were treated unequally in
intestate succession to both real and personal property. According
to section 43-3-12, when a married woman died intestate, her hus-
band was entitled to one-half of her personal property and the use
of her real property during his life.57 This provision of the Alabama
Code was clearly designed to be a statutory substitute for the com-
52. AjA. CODE § 43-3-1 (1975) (amended 1980).
53. Id.
54. ALA. CODE § 43-3-1 (Supp. 1981).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) ("we can judicially notice that in
this country, presumably due to the greater longevity of women, a large proportion of e3-
tates, both intestate and under wills of decedents, are administered by surviving widows").
57. ALA. CODE § 43-3-12 (1975).
1982] 383
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mon-law "curtesy" of the husband. 8 When a married man died in-
testate, however, section 43-3-10 provided that his wife was enti-
tled to all the personal property only if the intestate had no
children, to one-half if he had one child, to a child's share if he had
more than one and not more than four children, and to one-fifth if
the intestate had more than four children. 9
In the First Special Session of 1981, the Alabama Legislature
amended both the real property" and personal property"' intestate
succession statutes to make their wording completely sex-neutral.02
"Surviving spouse" was substituted for "husband or wife" in sec-
tion 43-3-1 and "spouse" was substituted for "widow" in section
43-3-10. As a result of this redrafting, additional changes were re-
quired. The same act, therefore, abolished curtesy" for the hus-
band by repealing section 43-3-12 of the Alabama Code; the sex-
biased wording of the statute was made more sex-neutral, and the
substance of the section was incorporated into section 43-3-10. The
amended statute provided:
The personal estate of persons dying intestate as to such estate, af-
ter the payment of debts and charges against the estate, is to be
distributed in the same manner as real estate, and according to the
same rules; if a spouse having a separate estate dies intestate, leav-
ing a spouse living, the surviving spouse is entitled to one half of
the personalty of such separate estate absolutely and to the use of
the realty during his or her lifetime."
Once this change was in place, a conflict became apparent. As pre-
viously noted65 section 43-3-1 determines intestate succession of
real property, and section 43-3-10 does the same for personal prop-
erty. Since the legislature incorporated the provisions of the old
58. Lake v. Russell, 180 Ala. 199, 60 So. 850 (1913). Accord, Holt, Intestate Succession
in Alabama, 23 ALA. L. REv. 319, 339 (1971).
59. ALA. CODE § 43-3-10 (1975).
60. Id. § 43-3-1.
61. Id. 8 43-3-10.
62. Act of August 20, 1981, Pub. Act No. 967, § 1, Spec. Sess., 1981 Ala. Acts 148, 148-
49 (amending §§ 43-3-1 and 43-3-10 of the Alabama Code).
63. Id. § 2, 1981 Ala. Acts 148, 149 (repealing § 43-3-12). Section 1 of this Act evi-
dences the incorporation of repealed § 43-3-12 into § 43-3-10. See notes 59 & 62 supra and
accompanying text.
64. Act of August 20, 1981, Pub. Act No. 967, 8 1, Spec. Sess., 1981 Ala. Acts 148, 148-
49 (amending § 43-3-1 and 43-3-10; repealing § 43-3-12 and incorporating it into § 43-3-10)
(emphasis added to indicate incorporation of § 43-3-12).
65. See text accompanying notes 60 and 61 supra.
384 [Vol. 33:2:375
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curtesy statute, section 43-3-12, into section 43-3-10, some provi-
sions for distribution of real property were codified in the personal
property distribution statute. To remedy this problem, the Ala-
bama Legislature in its Third Special Session of 1981 again
amended section 43-3-10.6 The statute then read:
The personal estate of persons dying intestate as to such estate, af-
ter the payment of debts and charges against the estate, is to be
distributed in the same manner as real estate, and according to the
same rules; except that in any event the surviving spouse is entitled
to no less than one half of the personalty of such separate estate
absolutely.67
During the period under review, the Alabama Supreme Court
has also initiated changes in the area of property law. The Ala-
bama statute providing for the automatic revocation of a woman's
will in the event of her marriage68 was held unconstitutional by the
court as a denial of equal protection of the law.69 Nevertheless, a
wife retained the right to dissent from her husband's will and take
her dower interest in lieu of her portion under the will.70 A similar
election was not available to a surviving husband; therefore, a mar-
ried woman could prevent her husband from receiving any interest
in her separate estate by leaving a valid will giving her property to
others. 1 In the 1979 case of Dorough v. Johnson7 2 however, a wo-
man dissented from her husband's will, and the Alabama Supreme
Court remarked that "[a]ppellants failed to raise any issue as to
the constitutionality of the statutory procedure for dissent which
allows the widow the right to claim against the will with no corre-
sponding right to a widower. '7 3 When faced squarely with the is-
sue, the court held this statute violates the equal protection clause
66. Act of December 1, 1981, Pub. Act No. 1170, § 1, Third Spec. Sess., 1981 Ala. Acts
454, 454-55 (amending § 43-3-10).
67. Id. (emphasis added to indicate additions).
68. ALA. CODE § 43-1-8 (1975) (declared unconstitutional, 1978).
69. Parker v. Hill, 362 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1978).
70. ALA. CODE § 43-1-15 (1975). The Arkansas Supreme Court has recently held that
an Arkansas statute providing dower rights for the surviving wife but not the surviving hus-
band violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. See Stokes v.
Stokes, 613 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1981).
71. See Mindler v. Crocker, 245 Ala. 578, 582, 18 So. 2d 278, 281 (1944); Knowles,
supra note 4, at 452.
72. 373 So. 2d 1082 (Ala. 1979).
73. Id. at 1087 n.3.
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of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
and left to the legislature the question whether to extend it to wid-
owers.74 The new Probate Code provides for a right of election
available to the surviving spouse, whether widow or widower.75
The new statute also makes the homestead allowance available
on a sex-neutral basis to the surviving spouse.7 6 In 1981 the Ala-
bama Supreme Court had held that Alabama's former Homestead
Act," which was gender-based, violated the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.78 Although the statute was un-
derinclusive-benefiting only the widow and not the widower-and
thus unconstitutional, the court declined to declare the statute in-
valid. Instead, the court elected to expand the benefits available
under the statute to surviving husbands to better effectuate the
intent of the legislature.79 However, by the time of this decision,
the legislature had amended the statute to make it sex-neutral, 80
the same result achieved in the new Probate Code.81
Prior to the adoption of the new Probate Code, the greatest
area of gender-based law in Alabama was that governing dece-
dent's estates.8 2 Provisions for statutory dower,83 the widow's right
to dissent from her husband's will, ' and the widow's right to quar-
antine85 all favored the widow to the detriment and often in defi-
ance of the deceased spouse .8 Although the impact of these provi-
sions was tempered somewhat by provisions like the one denying
dower to a surviving wife who had a separate estate greater than
her dower interest,87 they illustrate the sex bias that existed prior
to the adoption of the new Probate Code. The legislature has taken
74. Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1982).
75. Alabama Probate Code, Pub. Act No. 399, §§ 2-201, 2-203, 1982 Ala. Acts -..-
76. Id. § 2-206, 2-401, 1982 Ala. Acts -, _.
77. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 663 (1940) (applied only to "widows").
78. Ransom v. Ransom, 401 So. 2d 746 (Ala. 1981).
79. See id at 748.
80. ALA. CODE § 6-10-61 (1975).
81. Alabama Probate Code, Pub. Act No. 399, § 2-401, 1982 Ala. Acts -, -.
82. See generally Comment, Reverse Sex Discrimination Under Alabama's Law of
Decedents' Estates, 32 ALA. L. REV. 135 (1980); Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination in
the Alabama Probate Laws, 11 Cum. L. REV. 671 (1980).
83. ALA. CODE §§ 43-5-1 to -53 (1975).
84. Id. § 43-1-15.
85. Id. § 43-5-40.
86. See Comment, Reverse Sex Discrimination Under Alabama's Law of Decedents'
Estates, 32 ALA. L. REV. 135, 149 (1980).
87. ALA. CODE § 43-5-3 (1975).
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a giant step along the road suggested by the author" by adopting
the new comprehensive Probate Code with its gender-neutral
provisions.
V. FAMILY LAW
The legal rights and duties that traditionally have been based
on the assumption that man is the sole provider and woman is the
sole homemaker are no longer legitimate because the assumption is
faulty. "Today, fifty percent of all women are in the labor force
and ninety-one percent have been or will be in the labor force dur-
ing their lives." 89 Family law continues to change in recognition of
women's changing role in the workplace and in the family.90 In the
interval between the author's prior article and the present reexam-
ination, at least two issues of special importance to women and
their role in the family have emerged: domestic violence and the
marriage tax. Both have become issues of national concern, receiv-
ing attention from federal and state governments.
The Alabama Legislature passed two statutes in 1981 in re-
sponse to growing evidence of family violence. 1 The Protection
from Abuse Act92 established procedures for obtaining judicial re-
lief from violent disturbances within a family. Under the Act a
court may enter any temporary order it deems necessary to protect
the plaintiff or a minor child from abuse or from the danger of
abuse.93 This order may direct defendant to refrain from abusing
plaintiff, restore possession of the household to plaintiff to the ex-
clusion of defendant, award plaintiff temporary custody of minor
children or reasonable visitation rights with minor children, or re-
quire defendant to pay temporary reasonable support when defen-
88. Knowles, supra note 4, at 459-60.
89. Ellis, supra note 3, at 195 (citing Department of Labor Employment and Training
Report of the President).
90. See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
H Rv. L. REv. 1156 (1980).
91. There is a rapidly developing body of literature on domestic violence. Two publi-
cations by the Alabama Law Institute examine the problem of family violence and child
abuse, ALABAMA LAw INsTrruTE, FAbimy VIOLENCE (1980); ALAsAMA LAw INS-rtrn , CHILD
ABusE AND NEGLECT (1978). Various approaches to the problem are explored in Note, Do-
mestic Violence: Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 167 (1979).
92. Protection from Abuse Act, ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Supp. 1982).
93. See id. § 30-5-6(b).
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dant has a legal obligation to provide support.94
The Domestic Violence Shelters Act9 5 provides for the estab-
lishment of facilities to offer aid and shelter for victims of domes-
tic violence. Ironically, funding for these facilities comes from the
imposition of an additional five dollar tax on marriage licenses.90
The Act directs the Office for Prosecution Services to establish
minimum requirements for these shelters and to develop standards
for certifying which shelters will receive state funds.9 7 That office is
also responsible for approving or rejecting applications for funding
and for evaluating a facility to ensure its compliance with the min-
imum standards. 98
The marriage tax is a second problem area that has gained
increased attention during the last five years. The so-called mar-
riage tax is a creation of the federal income tax scheme; the rem-
edy, therefore, lies with the federal government.99 The present fed-
eral tax law treats a married couple as a single taxable unit 0 0 and
levies federal income taxes on the couple's total income. Married
individuals may elect to file separate returns, but the rate schedule
for single persons is not applicable and a higher tax liability than
94. See id. § 30-5-7.
95. Domestic Violence Shelters Act, id. § 30-6-1 to -13. Results of federal government
attention to this problem include the creation of the Office on Domestic Violence, see 44
Fed. Reg. 25, 699 (1979), and funding for project support and staff. See Joseph A. Califano,
Jr., Memorandum to Arabella Martinez (May 22, 1979); Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Memoran-
dum to Julius Richmond (May 22, 1979). However, a bill to provide support for state and
local projects failed to pass the Senate in 1980.
96. See ALA. CODE § 30-6-11 (Supp. 1982).
97. See id. § 30-6-3.
98. Implementation of this statute has been delayed by a suit brought in Tuskegee
seeking an injuction against its operation and a declaration that the Act imposes an uncon-
stitutional tax. See Roberts v. Young, CV-81-110 (Macon County, Ala.). The plaintiffs, an
individual who had to pay the fee, on behalf of herself and other fee-payers, and the Pro-
bate Judge of Russell County, in his official capacity and as President of the Alabama Pro-
bate Judges Association, have moved for summary judgment. No date for trial of this case
has been set pending decision on that motion. Letter from Ellen I. Brooks, Deputy District
Attorney of Montgomery County (May 6, 1982).
99. Literature on this aspect of the tax structure is extensive. See, e.g., Wenig, Marital
Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 189 (1. Douthwaite 1979); Bittker,
Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1416-43 (1975). See gen-
erally I. Sloan, LIVING TOGErrHER 43-47 (1980); Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Compara-
tive Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 49
(1971); Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDIIAM L.
REV. 27 (1978).
100. See Gerzog, supra note 99, at 29.
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would be incurred by the filing of a joint return usually results. 01
Differing tax rates in conjuction with other provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code produce a "marriage penalty" when two income-
producing individuals marry. 02 Marriage does not always produce
a tax penalty, however; in some cases a tax savings, or marriage
bonus, will result when an income earner marries someone with no
taxable income and the couple files a joint return. 03 Generally, if a
couple's total income is allocated between them more evenly than
80%-20%, their total tax liability will increase upon marriage. ' "
Judicial challenges to the constitutionality and legality of this
scheme have all failed, 0 5 and until 1981, none of the proposed so-
lutions to this problem received legislative approval. 06 The Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981, however, contains a "Deduction for
101. See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1429-31.
102. See Gerzog, supra note 99, at 27.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 28; Wenig, supra note 99, at 206. The Internal Revenue Code contains
at least 40 sections that treat married and single individuals differently for tax purposes. Id.
105. See Gerzog, supra note 99, at 37-40. The marriage penalty, questioned because
two single individuals would have a lower tax burden than a similarly situated married
couple, has been upheld as constitutional based on the principle of horizontal equity. This
principle requires only that all married couples be treated alike regardless of differences in
their income pattern, not that married couples be treated like two similarly situated individ-
uals. In Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012
(1976), the court held that the tax law did not discriminate against women by imposing a
higher marginal tax rate on their income when combined with that of their husbands. Id. at
968-69. Additionally, the court said the tax law did not impermissibly infringe upon the
couple's constitutional right to marry. Id. at 973-74. The Court of Claims in Mapes v.
United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), reiterated the find-
ings in Johnson, see id. at 900, and, in addition, concluded that the legislative attempts at
horizontal equity were not unreasonable. See id. at 902-04. The "marriage penalty" was
challenged on constitutional grounds again in Pierce v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 1
80,563 (1980), in which plaintiffs contended that the "'marriage ceremony tax' is unconsti-
tutional, encourages immoral behavior, and interferes with the right to marry." Id. The
court simply deferred to precedent: "The marriage penalty, inequitable as it is. has been
upheld as constitutional." Id. 80,564.
The Internal Revenue Service recently challenged the practice of couples who divorce at
the end of the year for tax reduction purposes and then remarry at the beginning of the
subsequent year, see Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980). In this case the divorce-
remarriage scheme was held invalid for lack of jurisdiction by the foreign court granting the
divorce. See id. at 995-97. Mr. and Mrs. Boyter were not allowed to file as single individuals
for the tax year in question. See id. at 1001. Couples seem to have only two choices under
the federal tax laws: (1) legally divorce but live together and file as single individuals, or (2)
marry and pay higher taxes.
106. For a list of specific proposals, see Moerschbaecher, The Marriage Penalty and
the Divorce Bonus: A Comparative Examination of the Current Legislative Tax Proposals,
5 REV. TAx. INDMDUALS 133, 138-45 (1981).
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Two-Earner Married Couples." The new law provides that married
couples filing a joint return may deduct an amount equal to ten
percent of the earned income of the spouse with the lower earned
income for the taxable year but not in excess of $30,000.107
It is noteworthy that the issues of domestic violence and the
marriage tax are finally on the state and national agendas and are
receiving the attention they deserve. At the same time that these
two issues began receiving attention, significant developments be-
gan to occur in other areas of family law, especially in the laws on
alimony, child custody, and child support.
A. Marriage
Alabama, like all states,108 has statutory requirements for mar-
riage. These statutory provisions include requirements of age,109 li-
censing,110 and health examination.""' In addition, the parties to an
incestuous union are subject to criminal penalty.112
The Supreme Court of Alabama has recently held s that mar-
ried women "are not legally required"" 4 to register to vote in their
husband's name, but may use "the names by which they have cho-
sen to be known and have used."11 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
court found that Forbush v. Wallace e "does not accurately state
107. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 26 U.S.C.A. § 221 (Supp. 1982). The amount
deductible for 1982 is limited to 5% up to a maximum amount of $1500, but thereafter to
10% up to a maximum of $3000. Id. For a discussion of the reasons for these changes, see
H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1981).
108. See F. HARPER & J. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 143-46 (rev. ed. 1962).
109. Until recently Alabama law allowed women to marry at a younger age than men.
Ala. Code tit. 34, §§ 4, 10 (1958). Under the 1975 Code, however, both females and males
can marry at 18 without parental consent. ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 (1975). The minimum age
requirement for marriage with parental consent in Alabama is 14. ALA. CODE § 30-1-4
(1975).
110. ALA. CODE § 30-1-9 (1975).
111. ALA. CODE § 22-16-5 (1975).
112. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-3 (Supp. 1981). For a more complete survey of marriage laws
in Alabama, see Knowles, supra note 4, at 462-72.
113. Alabama v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982), summarized in 50 U.S.L.W. 2620
(1982).
114. Id. at 1048.
115. Id. at 1047.
116. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972). In Forbush a
three-judge federal court found that under Alabama common law a married woman who
does not change her name by court proceeding must use her husband's surname after their
marriage as her legal name.
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the common law on names,"11 7 and that a married woman may use
any name by which she chooses to be known, provided, of course,
that the choice is not made for a fraudulent purpose.11 8
B. Mothers and Children
Although change is occurring, some aspects of family law still
reflect the traditional sex roles of mothers and fathers.119 An exam-
ple of this statutory tradition is the father's duty to support his
children during their minority as long as the children remain mem-
bers of his family.12 0 The desertion and nonsupport statutes define
"parent" as the natural legal parent, the legal guardian of a child,
or the father of an illegitimate child. 21 The mother of an illegiti-
mate child may initiate proceedings upon her pregnancy and no
later than five years after the birth of her child to establish its
paternity.1 22 In 1976, in Roe v. Conn,12 3 a three-judge federal court
held unconstitutional portions of two Alabama statutes that set
forth procedures for legitimation.1 24 The objectionable provisions
permitted a father to legitimate a child merely by declaring him-
self the father1 25 and to change the child's name in the same pro-
ceeding.126 Neither statute provided for notice to the mother or en-
sured protection of the child's interests. 27  The Alabama
Legislature recently responded to this holding by substantially
amending the legitimation statutes.1 28 The Code now provides that
upon the father's proper filing of a declaration seeking to legiti-
117. Alabama v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043, 1047 (Ala. 1982), summarized in 50 U.S.IW.
2620 (1982).
118. Id. at 1048.
119. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 472; text accompanying notes 88 & 89 supra.
120. Godfrey v. Hays, 6 Ala. 501, 503 (1844). The mother as well as the father may be
convicted of criminal nonsupport, however. AL. CODE § 13A-13-4 (Supp. 1980).
121. Ai.A CODE § 30-4-50 (1975). This section imposes a legal duty of support upon
one who has "publicly acknowledged or treated the child as his own, in a manner to indicate
his voluntary assumption of parenthood," whether the alleged parent is in fact the child's
father. Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 430, 191 So. 803, 805 (1939).
122. ALA. CODE §§ 26-12-1 to -9 (1975).
123. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
124. Id. at 781-83; Knowles, supra note 4, at 473-74.
125. Ala. Code tit. 27, § 11 (Supp. 1973) (current version at ALA. CODE § 26-11-2
(Supp. 1981)).
126. Id. tit. 27, § 12 (current version at AL. CODE § 26-11-3 (Supp. 1981)).
127. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 781-82 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
128. ALA. CODE §§ 26-11-2 to -3 (Supp. 1981).
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mate his child, the probate court must notify the mother and allow
thirty days for her to respond.129 The probate court must appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the child if the mother objects to
the declaration or if the appointment would be in the best interest
of the child.1 30 The statute prescribes similar procedures when the
father requests that the child's name be changed."' 1
During the past five years the Alabama Supreme Court has
addressed another legal concern of illegitimate children. In Ever-
age v. Gibson1 3 2 the court sought to avoid a potential constitutional
challenge to Alabama's intestacy scheme, which makes illegitimate
children the heirs of their mother but not of their father. 3 In an
attempt to comply with United States Supreme Court standards,
particularly those set out in Trimble v. Gordon,13 4 the court added
a third possible method of legitimation to the procedures already
recognized as appropriate methods for obtaining inheritance under
the intestacy scheme. 5 The court had previously recognized the
father's marriage to the child's mother and subsequent recognition
of the child as his own or the father's voluntary filing of a written
declaration of recognition as a proper procedure for legitimation.30
In Everage the court concluded that an adjudication of paternity
under Alabama's paternity statute1 7 also protected the child's
right to assert inheritance rights.138 The new Probate Code is con-
sistent with the result in Everage, and, to the extent that it effects
129. Id. § 26-11-2(b).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 26-11-3.
132. 372 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1979).
133. ALA. CODE §§ 26-11-1 to -2, 26-12-1 to -9, 43-3-1, 43-3-7 (1975). See Holt, A Plea
for Moderation of Alabama's Harsh Treatment of Succession to Parental Property by Ille-
gitimates, 12 CUM. L. REV. 27, 35 n.37 (1981).
134. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a statute
allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from intestate father only it there has been a decla-
ration of paternity and an order declaring paternity within father's lifetime).
135. Everage v. Gibson, 372 So. 2d 829, 833 (Ala. 1979).
136. Id.
137. ALA. CODE § 26-12-1 to -9 (1975).
138. Everage v. Gibson, 372 So. 2d 829, 833 (Ala. 1979). The court's decision in Ever-
age has been criticized on the ground that it provides only ephemeral protection to an inno-
cent party-the child-in the barren interest of preserving the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. Id. at 838 (Jones, J., dissenting); Note, An Equal Protection Challenge to Alabama's
Intestacy Scheme As It Affects Illegitimate Children: Everage v. Gibson, 31 ALA. L. REV.
493, 507 (1980). A recently-enacted statute extends the period of time during which a pater-
nity suit may be filed from two years to five years. ALA. CODE § 26-12-7 (Supp. 1981).
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changes in the law governing the inheritance rights of an illegiti-
mate, it improves them. '
C. Divorce and Alimony
The statutes governing the grounds for divorce have not been
changed during the last five years. 40 Two grounds for divorce con-
tinue to be available to only one spouse. The husband may ground
his petition on the wife's being pregnant without his knowledge or
agency at the time of their marriage.1 41 On the other hand, nonsup-
port is a ground available only to the wife.14 2
Although legislative action to correct these sex-biased divorce
statutes has not been tendered, the state legislature has corrected
the sex bias in Alabama's alimony statute by extending alimony to
husbands as well as wives.1 43 Under the former law only the hus-
band could be ordered to pay alimony upon dissolution of the mar-
riage.144 In the 1979 decision of Orr v. Orr,1 45 the United States
Supreme Court found these Alabama alimony statutes underinclu-
sive and, therefore, violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.146 In response, the Alabama Legislature re-
pealed one statute147 and passed several amendments making the
alimony statutes gender-neutral.1 48 A judge now has the power to
order either a husband or wife to provide support for the spouse.14 9
These amendments dramatically alter the statutory scheme for ali-
mony, but the courts will probably continue to consider the same
139. Alabama Probate Code, Pub. Act No. 399, §§ 2-109, 2-611, 1982 Ala. Acts_ -
140. For a discussion of divorce in Alabama, see Knowles, supra note 4, at 474-77.
141. ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(10) (1975). Although this ground appears to be a permissible
classification on the basis of sex since it involves a unique physical characteristic, the statute
should allow the wife to seek a divorce if another woman was carrying the husband's child at
the time of his marriage.
142. Id. § 30-2-1(12).
143. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-31, -50, -51, -52, -54 (Supp. 1981).
144. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 (allowance for wife upon grant of divorce), -52 (amended
1979) (allowance for wife upon grant of divorce for misconduct of husband), -53 (repealed
1979) (allowance for wife upon grant of divorce for misconduct of wife) (1975).
145. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
146. Id. at 278-83.
147. ALA. CODE § 30-2-53 (Supp. 1981).
148. Id. §§ 30-2-31, -50, -51, -52, -54.
149. Id. A provision for the termination of periodic alimony when the receiving spouse
remarries or cohabits was added in 1978 and reenacted in 1981. See id. § 30-2-55; Comment,
Alimony, Cohabitation, and the Wages of Sin, 33 AI.A L. REv. - (1982).
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factors that they considered before Orr in arriving at a decision on
a request for support.150
D. Child Custody and Support
In the last five years the courts and legislature have also initi-
ated substantial changes in the law affecting child custody and
support. The recent Alabama Supreme Court decision in Devine v.
Devine, 5' for example, illustrates the full circle fraveled by courts
in treatment of the difficult questions surrounding child custody. 15 2
Originally, the father benefited from a judicial presumption that
he was the parent to have custody. 153 The courts had reasoned that
since the husband was the head and master of his family and re-
sponsible for the care and maintenance of his children, he was the
parent most responsible for the children.1" The Alabama courts
steadily modified this position, however, developing instead a
"tender years presumption." This presumption was "based upon
the inherent suitability of the mother to care for and nurture
young children. All things being equal, the mother [was] presumed
to be best fitted to guide and care for children of tender years." 15
Gradually, the tender years presumption displaced the influence of
the paternal preference rule and became recognized as a rebuttable
factual presumption. 5 '
In reliance on a number of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, 57 the Alabama Supreme Court announced in Devine that
"the tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gen-
der-based classification which discriminates between fathers and
mothers in custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex."' 58 In
the Devine case the court concluded that either the father or the
150. See Thompson v. Thompson, 377 So. 2d 141 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
151. 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981).
152. Id. at 691.
153. Id. at 688.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 691. The tender years presumption in favor of the mother was partially
codified, see Pub. Act No. 79, § 3808, 1872-73 Ala. Acts 125. The Act grants custody of the
child or children to the father when his wife voluntarily abandons him only if the child or
children have reached the age of seven. Id.
156. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 691 (Ala. 1981).
157. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
158. 398 So. 2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981).
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mother would be a capable and appropriate person to have custody
of minor children. Invocation of the tender years presumption in
favor of the mother, therefore, deprived the father of equal protec-
tion of the law.159 Writing for the majority in Devine, Justice Mad-
dox demonstrated, using historical evidence, how a presumption
can reflect the sex-stereotyping of a particular time in history and
asserted that courts had come to rely on the presumption as a sub-
stitute for careful factual analysis.160 Justice Maddox instructed
trail courts to weigh carefully the facts of each case before granting
custody and not to invoke mechanically an outdated
presumption. 61
159. Id.
160. Id. at 696.
161. Id. The court suggested consideration of a number of factors:
The sex and age of children are indeed very important considerations; however, the
court must go beyond these to consider the characteristics and needs of each child,
including their emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs; the respec-
tive home environments offered by the parties; the characteristics of those seeking
custody, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health; the capacity
and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material and
educational needs of the children; the interpersonal relationship between each child
and each parent; the interpersonal relationship between the children; the effect on
the child of disrupting or continuing an existing custodial status; the preference of
each child, if the child is of sufficient age and maturity; the report and recommenda-
tion of any expert witnesses or other independent investigator;, available alternatives;
and any other relevant matter the evidence may disclose.
Id. at 696-97. For a defense of the maternal presumption, see Uviller, Fathers' Rights and
Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOmEN'S LJ. 107 (1978).
In considering gender-based presumption in custody suits, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia chose an interesting approach in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.,.2d 357
(W. Va. 1981). The court changed the presumption in favor of the mother to one in favor of
the "primary caretaker parent." Id. at 362. In defending the existence of a presumption, the
court said it was necessary to have an established rule because full blown "hearings... do
not enhance justice, particularly since custody fights are highly destructive to the mental
health of the children." Id. at 361. The court provided a partial list of the criteria used to
determine the identity of the primary caretaker
In establishing which natural or adoptive parent is the primary caretaker, the trial
court shall determine which parent has taken primary responsibility for ... (1) pre-
paring and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing- (3) purchasing,
cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physi-
cians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e., transporting
to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alterna-
tive care, i.e., babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending
to child in the middle of the night, waking child in morning- (8) discipline, i.e., teach-
ing general manners and toilet training, (9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social,
etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id. at 363.
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The Alabama Legislature has also been active in the area of
child custody and support, taking two steps within the last five
years to deal with problems in the enforcement of custody and
support decrees. First, in 1980 the legislature joined forty-four
other states by adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act."8 2 This Act was developed as a response to concern for chil-
dren who are the subject of custody fights, and sometimes kidnap-
pings, that cross state lines.16 3 Second, in 1981 the legislature en-
acted a statute providing for the garnishment of up to forty
percent of the responsible parent's weekly disposable earnings for
the support of his or her minor child.164 This measure ensures ac-
cess to the earnings of parents who do not voluntarily comply with
the support decree.
Welcome changes have been made by both the judicial and
legislative branches of government in Alabama in the area of child
custody and support during the last five years. The reforms resem-
ble those that would have been required if the Equal Rights
Amendment had been ratified. The equitable and inherently just
nature of these changes highlights the desirability of passage of an
equal rights amendment.
VI. CITIZENSHIP
Certain basic rights that seem inherent to American citizen-
162. ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-21 to -44 (Supp. 1981).
163. See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Ju-
risdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1981). "In the first place, [the Act] elimi-
nates jurisdiction based on the physical presence of the child; second, it prohibits modifica-
tions of custody decrees of other states, with very limited exceptions; and then, it requires
summary enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees." Id. at 204.
The Paternal Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566
(1980), represents the Congressional response to this problem. This act provides that the
states must give full faith and credit to all child custody decrees and establishes the Federal
Parent Locater Service. Id. at 3569.
164. ALA. CODE § 6-6-490 (Supp. 1981). When this legislation was first enacted, there
was confusion about the maximum percentage that could be garnished because of a federal
statute allowing garnishment of from 50 to 65 percent of a parent's earnings in child support
cases. Compare id. with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b). A recent opinion of the Alabama Attorney
General makes clear, however, that the state statute governs since it is more restrictive than
the federal statute. See Letter from Eugenia D.B. Hofommann to Barbara A. Pippin (Nov.
25, 1981) (copy of letter on file, Alabama Law Review office).
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ship have only recently been granted to women. The right to vote
was not extended to Alabama women until ratification of the nine-
teenth amendment 65 by three-fourths of the states in 1920.16 A
possible obstacle to equal voting rights in Alabama may remain, 167
however, to the extent that a married woman is legally incapable of
establishing a domicile separate from that of her husband.16 8 Be-
cause single women and all men are free to establish or change
domicile, the denial of this right to married women is a denial of
equal protection of the laws. Although the Alabama Supreme
Court reaffirmed this common-law rule after the nineteenth
amendment was ratified, 1 9 the question has not yet been consid-
ered under the heightened standard of review currently applied to
sex-based classifications. 170
Among other recent sex-based abridgments of citizenship1 7 1
was the ban on women jurors in Alabama until 1966.172 In White v.
Crook17 3 a three-judge federal district court held Alabama's statute
restricting jury service to males violative of the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Although the Code was
amended to reflect this holding, the legislature adopted, in addi-
tion, a provision allowing the trial judge to excuse a woman from
jury service at her request "for good cause shown. '17 4 The exemp-
tion was a denial to female litigants of the opportunity to have a
jury of their peers, and a denial of full citizenship. Without com-
165. "The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX.
166. In Alabama, as in most states, the franchise was limited to male citizens. See ALA.
CONST. art. 8, § 177. Although the Alabama legislature rejected the nineteenth amendment
by a vote of 59 to 31, see Lumpkin, The Equal Suffrage Movement in Alabama, 1912-1919
at 146-47 (1949) (unpublished thesis in University of Alabama Library), the term "male"
was effectively striken from the state constitution upon its ratification. See Graves v.
Eubank, 205 Ala. 174, 87 So. 587 (1921).
167. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 483.
168. The traditional common-law rule was that upon marriage the domicile of the wife
becomes that of her husband. Alabama follows that rule, see Stafford v. State, 33 Ala. App.
163, 31 So. 2d 146 (1947). The wife was deemed incapable of legally establishing domicile
because it is assigned to her.
169. Wilkerson v. Lee, 236 Ala. 104, 181 So. 296 (1938).
170. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
171. See generally Knowles, supra note 4, at 484-85.
172. Compare Ala. Code tit. 30, § 21 (1958) (current version at AL. CoDE § 12-16-43
(1975)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 1979).
173. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
174. Ala. Code tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1973).
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ment or fanfare the special provision for female jurors was deleted
in the 1975 Code. 1"5 In 1978 the following statute was adopted by
the Alabama Legislature: "A citizen shall not be excluded from
jury service in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin or economic status. 17' Albeit tardy, legislative rec-
ognition that special treatment undercuts the claim of full citizen-
ship, which includes both rights and responsibilities, is
commendable.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW
Alabama's new Criminal Code became effective on January 1,
1980.177 The relevant portions of the Code were analyzed in the
previous article.17 8 Topics that were affected by the new code in-
clude prostitution, 179 sexual assaults,180 abortion,1 81 presumed coer-
175. According to the Table of Comparative Sections of the 1975 Alabama Code, tit.
30, § 21 was replaced by § 12-16-43, Alabama Code, from which the sentence excusing wo-
men was omitted. Section 12-16-43 has now been repealed. ALA. CODE § 12-6-43 (Supp.
1981).
176. ALA. CODE § 12-16-56 (Supp. 1981). The present code provisions concerning selec-
tion and qualification of jurors are contained in §§ 12-16-55 to -64 of the Alabama Code.
177. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-11 (Supp. 1981).
178. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 487-505.
179. The new Criminal Code contains no provision making prostitution or patroniza-
tion of a prostitute a criminal offense. Local governments are given authority to prohibit
houses of prostitution and punish the inmates of such houses, see ALA. CODE § 11-47-113
(1975), but the patrons go unpunished. Criminalization of only one of the participants rests
on tenuous ground as evidenced by scholarly writings, see, e.g., Haft, Hustling for Rights, 1
Civ. LIB. REV. 8 (1974), and decisions from other states, see Note, Criminal Law-The Prin-
ciple of Harm and Its Application to Laws Criminalizing Prostitution, 51 DEN. L.J. 235,
238 n.12 (1974). For a discussion of Alabama's new prostitution statutes, see Knowles, supra
note 4, at 488-93. For two more recent discussions of prostitution, see Milman, New Rules
for the Oldest Profession: Should We Change Our Prostitution Laws? 3 HARe. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (1980) and Walkowitz, The Politics of Prostitution, 6 SIGNS 123 (1980).
180. The law of sexual assault, including rape, has been substantially reorganized
under the new Criminal Code. Alabama now has a statutory definition and provision for
punishment of both rape and sodomy. ALA. ConE § 13A-60-64 (Supp. 1981). For a further
discussion of the sexual assault provisions in the new criminal code, see Knowles, supra note
4, at 493-98. For a more recent discussion of rape, see Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribu-
lation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COL. L. REV. 1 (1977); Johnson, On the Prevalance
of Rape in the United States, 6 SIGNS 136 (1980); Gollin, Comment on Johnson's "On the
Prevalance of Rape in the United States," 6 SIGNS 349 (1980); Johnson, Reply to Gollin, 6
SIGNS 349 (1980).
181. The criminal abortion statute has been on the books in its present form in Ala-
bama since 1951 and permits abortion only to save the life or preserve the health of the
mother. ALA. CODE § 13-8-4 (1975) (transferred to § 13A-13-7 (Supp. 1981)). The Alabama
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cion,1 8 2 family offenses, 18 3 the "unwritten law" defense,'" the
Peeping Tom statute, 85 verbal assaults,' juveniles,181 sentencing
statute is clearly unconstitutional when applied during the first or second trimesters of preg-
nancy. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A number
of bills to regulate abortion even further have been introduced into the legislature each year,
but none has passed.
The United States Supreme Court's latest statement on abortion was in H.L v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). The Court held that a state may require a physician to notify the
parents of a minor woman or the husband of a married woman who is to have an abortion.
Id.
For two recent discussions on abortion, see Hayler, Abortion, 5 SIGS 307 (1979); Note,
Restriction on Women's Right to Abortion: Informed Consent, Spousal Consent and Re-
cordkeeping Provisions, 5 Wo1m's RIGHTS L. REP. 35 (1978).
182. "Under Alabama common law a married woman was excused from many of her
crimes if committed in the presence of her husband .... While in his presence, she was
presumed to have acted in obedience to his will and under his coercion." Knowles, supra
note 4, at 499 (footnote omitted). The presumption was rebuttable, however, and did not
apply in prosecutions for every crime. Id. at 500. The doctrine has only recently been abol-
ished by the new Criminal Code. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-30(c) (Supp. 1981). For a discus-
sion of this doctrine before its abolition, see Knowles, supra note 4, at 499-500.
183. Sections of the new Criminal Code concerning crimes against a child or the family
are of special interest for purposes of this Article. Although the generic "he" is used
throughout the new Code (with the exception of the statute defining rape, ALA. CODE § 13A-
60-62 (Supp. 1981)), the sections dealing with nonsupport, id. § 13A-13-4, abandonment of a
child, id. § 13A-13-5, and endangering the welfare of a child, id. § 13A-13-6, describe the
actor as "a man or woman." This use of language emphasizes that either sex could be guilty
of criminal nonsupport, abandonment of a child, and endangering the welfare of a child. See
Knowles, supra note 4, at 500-01.
184. The "unwritten law" defense is a defense to a charge of homicide of the defen-
dant's wife or her paramour if the wife and paramour are discovered in the act of sexual
intercourse. Although the complete defense is not recognized in Alabama, under the circum-
stances contemplated by the defense the defendant will probably be charged with man-
slaughter rather than murder. For a further discussion of the requirements for reduction of
the charge, see Knowles, supra note 4, at 501. Note, however, that the cases speak only of
situations in which the husband kills his wife; no Alabama case has dealt with the corre-
sponding situation in which the wife kills her husband upon discovering him engaged in
sexual intercourse with a paramour.
185. The Alabama Peeping Tom statute, which made criminal the conduct of any
male who without legal cause looked into any apartment, house, or room at night that was
occupied by a female, was repealed by the new Criminal Code. Pub. Act No. 607 § 9901,
1977 Ala. Acts at 911. The proscribed activity is now covered under the new crime of crimi-
nal surveillance, At.4. CODE § 13A-11-32 (Supp. 1981), which is sex-neutraL
186. The new Criminal Code repealed by omission the old and infrequently used stat-
utes that made it a crime to use "abusive, insulting, or obscene language" in the presence or
hearing of any girl or woman, see Ala. Code § 13-6-18 (1975), or to disturb a woman in a
public place using such language, see id. § 13-6-101. The Supreme Court of Alabama re-
cently declared unconstitutional § 13-6-18 as violative of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution because it makes an "unwarranted gender based distinction."
Frolik v. State, 392 So. 2d 846, 847 (Ala. 1981). These statutes have been replaced by the
sex-neutral crime of disorderly conduct, which is defined to include the use of "abusive or
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and incarceration.188 Because of the growing evidence and aware-
ness of marital rape,"8 ' and the possibility of problems with Ala-
bama's gender-based rape statute, a reexamination of the topic of
the law of sexual assault is important.
Alabama's statutory provision governing sex offenses defines
"female" as "[a]ny female person who is not married to the ac-
tor." 190 Thus, it is not a criminal offense for a man to engage in
forcible or unwanted sexual contact with his wife. In addition,
"sexual contact" is defined as "[a]ny touching of the sexual or
other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, done for
the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party."'91 A
growing body of evidence indicates that marital rape is a signifi-
cant social problem, a problem that is often related to the bat-
tering of wives.'92 At this time, when Alabama is moving to supply
assistance programs for victims of family battering"9 " and legal
remedies to prevent family violence,' 9 ' the exclusion of marital
obscene language" or an obscene gesture in a public place. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-7 (Supp.
1981).
187. Until establishment of the Judicial Article Implementation Act, Pub. Act No.
1205, 1975 Ala. Acts 2384 (codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 15 of ALA. CODE
(1975)), jurisdiction over juveniles was exercised by a multitude of lower courts. The maxi-
mum age of persons subject to juvenile jurisdiction varied from county to county. Compare
Ala. Code tit. 62, § 311 (1958) with Ala. Code tit. 13, § 350 (1958) (repealed 1975). It was a
common practice to extend jurisdiction over females for a number of extra years apparently
based on the theory that females needed supervision for a longer period of time than did
males. See Davis & Chaires, Equal Protection for Juveniles: The Present Status of Sex-
Based Discrimination in Juvenile Court Laws, 7 GA. L. REV. 494, 499 (1973). Juvenile juris-
diction is now vested in the district and circuit courts, ALA. CODE § 12-12-34 (1975), and the
maximum age is 19 years for all persons. Id. § 12-15-1.
188. Unequal treatment of the sexes occurs throughout the American criminal justice
system. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 504; Clements, Sex and Sentencing, 26 Sw. L.J. 890
(1972). While females had been given special treatment under Alabama law in sentencing
and imprisonment, the disparity in treatment that still exists reflects the persistence of ster-
eotypical thinking rather than gender-based legal requirements. See Knowles, supra note 4,
at 504-05.
189. See Barden, Confronting the Moral and Legal Issue of Marital Rape, N.Y.
Times, June 1, 1981, at 85.
190. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (Supp. 1981). The definition continues: "Persons living
together in cohabitation are married for purposes of this article, regardless of the legal sta-
tus of their relationship otherwise." Id.
191. Id. 13A-6-60(3) (emphasis added).
192. See Barden, supra note 189. For a review of the issues in defending women, see
E. BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES (1981).
193. See Domestic Shelters Act, ALA. CODE §§ 30-6-1 to -13 (Supp. 1982); text accom-
panying notes 95-98 supra.
194. See Protection from Abuse Act, ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Supp. 1982); text
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rape from our criminal laws should end.
The Alabama Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitu-
tionality of Alabama's "rape shield" law."9 5 This statute provides
that evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior is admissi-
ble, either on direct or cross-examination, in a prosecution for rape
only if the court determines after an in camera hearing that the
victim's "past sexual behavior directly involved the participation
of the accused."'19 Challenges to the constitutionality of the provi-
sion have been made, but the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
has found it unnecessary to reach the issue in any case.1 Other
jurisdictions possessing similar rape shield statutes have scruti-
nized them and have accepted them as constitutionally
permissible. 198
In 1981 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of California's gender-based statutory rape law, which
punishes an "act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female
not the wife of the perpetrator, when the female is under the age of
18 years."'199 This decision 00 led to reexamination of the relevant
Alabama statutes for potential constitutional problems.
In upholding the California statute, which punishes only
males, the Supreme Court applied a test requiring the classifica-
tion to bear a "substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives."'2 0' The Court accepted California's stated purpose-the
prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies-as sufficient justifi-
accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
195. "Rape shield" statutes restrict the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct
of the victim in a sex offense case. See Lawson v. State, 377 So. 2d 1115, 1116-17 (Ala. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 377 So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 1979); ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1975); FED. R. EvID.
412. A recent article on rape shield laws suggests that some of these statutes present sixth
amendment problems. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 544 (1980).
196. ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1975). For a discussion of this section, see Knowles supra
note 4, at 497.
197. See Lawson v. State, 377 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 377
So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 1979); Stuggs v. State, 372 So. 2d 49, 53 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
372 So. 2d 55 (Ala.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979); Knox v. State, 365 So. 2d 349, 349
(Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Turley v. State, 356 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
198. See, e.g., Dorn v. State, 267 Ark. 365, _ 590 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1979); State v.
Williams, 224 Kan. 468, _ 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1978); Annot., 94 A.LR.4th 283 (1980).
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261-5 (West Supp. 1980).
200. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
201. Id. at 469 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
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cation for the sex-based classification in this statute.202 Several jus-
tices rendered strong dissenting opinions, however. Justice Bren-
nan, with whom Justices White and Marshall joined, argued that
the law should be held unconstitutional because the State could
not show a substantial relationship between the claimed govern-
mental purpose and the operation of the sexually discriminatory
statute."' He noted that "at least 37 states. . . have enacted gen-
der-neutral statutory rape laws," and no evidence supports the
claim that these states have been handicapped in enforcing their
statutes or protecting their social values.2' In another dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens questioned whether it is permissible for a state to hold
responsible only one of two equally guilty wrong-doers: "Would a
rational parent making rules for the conduct of twin children of
opposite sex simultaneously forbid the son and authorize the
daughter to engage in conduct that is especially harmful to the
daughter? ,205
In Alabama, statutory rape is treated in sections 13A-6-
61(a)(3) and 13A-6-62(a)(1) of the Alabama Code.206 Both the of-
fenses of rape in the first degree and rape in the second degree are
felonies and are crimes that by definition only a male can com-
mit.20 7 Arguably the offense of sexual abuse208 is broad enough to
cover some of the same acts prohibited by the statutory rape sec-
tions, thereby proscribing females from committing the acts.209 Ap-
plication of the sexual abuse sections to these acts would require a
202. Id. at 470.
203. Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 492-93.
205. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a) (Supp. 1981) ("A male commits the crime of rape in the
first degree if: .... (3) He, being 16 years or older, ebgages in sexual intercourse with a
female who is less than 12 years old."). Id. § 13A-6-62(a) ("A male commits the crime of
rape in the second degree if: (1) Being 16 years old or older, he engages in sexual intercourse
with a female less than 16 and more than 12 years old; provided, however, the actor is at
least two years older than the female.").
207. Id. §8 13A-6-61 to -62.
208. Id. §8 13A-6-66 to -67. Section 13A-6-66 provides in pertinent part: "(a) A person
commits the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree if: . . . . (3) He, being 16 years old or
older, subjects another person to sexual contact who is less than 12 years old." Section 13A-
6-67 provides, in pertinent part- "(a) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the
second degree if: . . . . (2) He, being 19 years or older, subjects another person to sexual
contact who is less than 16 years old, but more than 12 years old."
209. Interview with Ellen Brooks, Deputy District Attorney of Montgomery County
(Oct. 15, 1981).
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holding that the "sexual contact" which is the actus reus of that
offense includes sexual intercourse. The definition of "sexual con-
tact 21 0 does not appear to preclude such a holding, but the Code's
separate definitions of sexual contact and sexual intercourse 2 ' sug-
gest that the drafters did not intend one definition to include the
other. Additional support for this conclusion is the statement in
the Commentary to section 13A-6-65 that sexual misconduct, a
class A misdemeanor, "provides the outside limit of criminality for
a woman who has intercourse with an unconsenting male; rape is
limited to acts initiated by a male, and sodomy does not include
heterosexual vaginal intercourse. '21 2
Other problems plague this analysis. Even if sexual abuse can
be interpreted to proscribe statutory rape by a female, the penalty
for sexual abuse is much less severe than the penalty for statutory
rape.215 Additionally, this statutory analysis fails to address the le-
gal consequences to a female between the ages of sixteen and
nineteen who has sexual intercourse with a male between the ages
of twelve and sixteen.214 Thus, even if the sexual abuse sections are
applicable, they are not sex-neutral, and a gap exists along the
continuum of offenses for which a female can be convicted under
the sexual abuse statute, a gap that does not exist under the gen-
der-based rape statute.
If the sexual abuse provisions are not applicable, a sixteen-
year-old female who has intercourse with a male less than sixteen
years of age would be guilty of sexual misconduct. The Alabama
Code provides that a female commits sexual misconduct if she "en-
gage[s] in sexual intercourse with a male without his consent
. . .,,,215 and a person less than sixteen years of age is deemed inca-
pable of consent.21  Sexual misconduct is a Class A
210. A.LA CODE § 13A-6-60(3) (Supp. 1981) defines sexual contact as "(a) Any touching
of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, done for the
purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party."
211. Id. § 13A-6-60(1) and (3).
212. Id. § 13A-6-65, Commentary. The commentary is, of course, unofficial.
213. Sexual abuse in the first degree is a Class C felony, id. § 13A-6.66(b), and sexual
abuse in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, id. § 13A-6-67(b). Rape, however, in
the first degree and in the second degree are Class A and Class C felonies respectively. Id.
§§ 13A-6-61(b) and -62(b).
214. See id. § 13A-6-66 to -67.
215. Id. § 13A-6-65(a)(2).




If immature sexual experience is one of the evils against which
the statutory rape laws are directed, it seems unwise to exclude
young men and boys from their protection. The Alabama statute
should be amended to make intercourse between an adult woman
and an underaged male the same category of offense as intercourse
between an adult male and an underaged female.
VIII. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
In the past five years, the number of women entering the legal
profession has continued to increase.21 In 1979 approximately nine
and one-half percent of all American lawyers and judges were wo-
men,219 compared to three and one-half percent in 1973.220 In 1980
twenty-seven percent of all law students were women,22 1 and in
some law schools, nearly one-half of the students are women.222
As more women have been admitted to law schools, more have
been appointed to law school faculties. In 1950 approximately two
percent of law professors who had tenure track positions and who
were not librarians were women . 2 In 1979 ten and one-half per-
cent of all law school teachers were women.224 Demands that more
217. Id. § 13A-6-65(b).
218. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, WOMEN IN THE COURTS 18 (1978). See
generally A. SACHS & J. WI.SON, SaxisM AND THE LAW (1978); Kanter, Reflections on Wo-
men and the Legal Profession: A Sociological Perspective, 1 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1978);
Rossman, Women Judges Unite: A Report from the Founding Convention of the National
Association of Women Judges, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 1237 (1980).
219. Note, The Role and Status of Women Jurists: Country-by-Country Summary, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1980).
220. Compare Soule & Standley, Perceptions of Sex Discrimination in Law, 59 A.B.A.
J. 1144 (1973) with Note, supra note 219, at 1270.
221. Shapiro & Johnson, What's a Nice Girl Like You Doing in a Profession Like
This? 8 STUDENT LAW. 18, 20 (May 1980). For a discussion of the Law School Admissions
Test as an obstacle to the admission of women to law school, see White & Roth, The Law
School Admissions Test and the Continuing Minority Status of Women in Law School, 2
HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 103 (1979).
222. Shapiro & Johnson, supra note 221, at 20. In 1981 at the University of Alabama
School of Law, 155 of the 523 students were women. Interview with Anna S. Fitts, Univer-
sity of Alabama School of Law Registrar, in Tuscaloosa, Alabama (Oct. 13, 1981). This sta-
tistic indicates an increase of 9.1% since 1977 when 101 of 491 students were women. See
Knowles, supra note 4, at 512.
223. Fossum, Women Law Professors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 903, 905
(1980).
224. Id. at 906.
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women be appointed to law school faculties are increasing.225 In
April of 1979, for example, the Coalition for a Diversified Faculty
filed a complaint with the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and the Labor Department against Berkeley's Boalt Hall
School of Law charging that "the lack of women on the faculty
impaired the school's service to female students, who lack proper
role models. 226
In 1980 six and six-tenths percent of all federal judges were
women (44 out of 667), the majority of whom were appointed after
1978.227 In 1981 President Reagan appointed Sandra Day
O'Connor to the Supreme Court. In Alabama, one woman, Justice
Janie L. Shores, sits on the supreme court. Seven of the 221 judges
sitting on other Alabama courts are women.228
The number of women participating in national and state bar
associations continues to increase as more women graduate from
law schools, but few women are in leadership positions. Approxi-
mately ten percent of the members of the American Bar Associa-
tion are women.22 In the past, only four women have chaired ABA
sections and only twelve of the 380 members of the House of Dele-
gates are women.230 In 1981, 117 women were admitted to the Ala-
bama bar,2 31 but no women held leadership positions.23 2
Women are also entering the political arena. At present, the
United States Senate has two women members and the House of
Representatives has seventeen women members.233 Although no
woman has ever been elected to the Alabama Senate, there are six
women in the House of Representatives.2
225. See Shapiro & Johnson, supra note 222, at 21. At the University of Alabama
School of Law four of the thirty-four members of the faculty are women. Two of these were
appointed after 1978.
226. Id.
227. Rossman, supra note 218, at 1240.
228. Letter from Ellen Brooks to Marjorie Fine Knowles (June 1, 1981) (letter on file
in Alabama Law Review office).
229. Griffin, With More Women Becoming Lawyers, 8 STUDENT LAw. 26, 27 (May
1980).
230. Id. at 27, 29.
231. Interview with Anna S. Fitts, University of Alabama School of Law Registrar, in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama (Oct. 14, 1981).
232. 1980-81 ALABAMA LEGAL DiREcTORY 69-70.
233. See 1981 CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIREcTORY 261-474.
234. 1980-81 ALABAMA LEGAL DIRECTORY 29-30.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The developments described in this Article reflect the move-
ment toward sex equity in our law and in our society. The passage
of the new Probate Code in Alabama has provided the comprehen-
sive revision needed to reform that area of the law which was most
gender-biased. The laws of Alabama are now almost entirely gen-
der-free. This quiet revolution has come about within the last dec-
ade, mirroring the important changes in the role of women in
American society and our increased understanding of, and sensitiv-
ity to, that role. Given what we know about the uneven course of
the quest for human liberty, it is worth remembering that without
an equal rights amendment, even these giant steps are all
reversible.
